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I. INTRODUCTION
The world's nations are reexamining governance in the face of globalization.
Former Soviet block nations are trying to become democracies and privatizing
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their economies. International institutions such as the World Bank' are exerting
pressure on developing nations to lay the necessary foundation for the rule of law
through legal infrastructure and innovations in governance.2 Non-Governmental
Organizations ("NGOs"), such as the American Bar Association's Central
European and Eurasian Law Initiative ("CEELI")3 and United States Agency for
International Development ("USAID"), have funded projects to provide
assistance with this process. Many of these projects recommend new institutions
to resolve conflicts over rights, property, and the legacy of ethnic violence. All of
these developments suggest the convergence of national governance systems.
While much attention has focused on Eastern Europe and Central Asia,'
South Korea, an established industrial economy, has quietly broadened and
deepened its democracy,6 and is presently building new, innovative governance
processes into its institutions There is a paradigm shift under way in South
Korea that is framed as public participation in governance. South Korea is
building new processes for conflict resolution and civic engagement into its
administrative law and practice. It is drawing on the experiences of other
countries and adapting them to its cultural context. The Korean Peninsula is the
next geographic region to face major challenges of democratization and
privatization. The lesson that Germany teaches is that re-unification of North and
South Korea is inevitable, and therefore, North Korea8 will likely inherit the
governance systems that South Korea is building today. 9
1. Douglas Webb, Legal and Institutional Reform Strategy and Implementation: A World Bank
Perspective, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 161 (1999). One observer notes that the World Bank's charter
precludes it from interfering with the politics of a member nation, but that administrative law and governance
are seen as "neutral and technical" conditions for fostering economic growth. Tom Ginsburg, Japanese Law
Symposium: Dismantling the "Developmental State"? Administrative Procedure Reform in Japan and Korea,
49 AM. J. CoMP. L. 585,622 (2001).
2. See Tamara Lothian and Katharina Pistor, Local Institutions, Foreign Investment, and Alternative
Strategies of Development: Some Views from Practice, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 101 (2003).
3. The Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative, http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/ (last visited Feb. 7,
2006).
4. For reports on various USAID projects on democracy and governance, see USAID, About USAID,
Publications, http://dec.usaid.gov/ demo-gov.cfm (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
5. Webb, supra note 1, at 161.
6. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 585-87 (observing that, in Korea, the political environment changed
dramatically in the mid-1990s as the result of democratization and constitutional reforms which created
incentives for politicians to open up the policy process and adopt a new administrative procedure regime).
7. Kyu Ho Youm, Freedom of Expression and the Law: Rights and Responsibilities in South Korea, 38
STAN. J. INT'L L. 123 (2002) (describing massive statutory changes concerning freedom of the press, political
rights, and civil liberties since 1987).
8. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea [hereinafter North Korea].
9. Curtis J. Milhaupt, Privatization and Corporate Governance in a Unified Korea, 26 IOWA J. CORP. L.
199 (2001). But see Joongi Kim, North Korea: Legal Perspectives and Analyses: Essay: The Challenges of
Attracting Foreign Investment into North Korea: The Legal Regimes of Sinuiju and Gaeseong, 27 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1306, 1311 (2004) (describing efforts by North Korea to establish special economic zones to attract
international investment in Sinuiju and Gaeseong in which North Korea adopted a comprehensive legal
structure similar to the Hong Kong precedent of one country but two systems that may presage a move toward a
market-based economic system).
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This article examines South Korea's '° implementation of new governance
processes, specifically, its growing use of conflict resolution and civic
engagement. First, this article discusses definitions of legal infrastructure.
Second, it addresses control over dispute-system design as a lens through which
to examine new governance processes. Third, it discusses recent developments in
the Korean Judicial and Executive branches. Lastly, it will address the
connections between new governance processes and economic development in
Korea.
II. GOVERNANCE, LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE, AND NEW GOVERNANCE
PROCESSES SUCH AS DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Governance occurs within the context of legal infrastructure, which includes
both substantive and procedural elements." Legal infrastructure's substantive
elements include property and contract rights, individual economic freedom, and
civil rights. Its procedural elements include the resources and institutions for
enforcing rights and resolving disputes.'2 These include not only public sector
institutions, such as courts and administrative forums within local, regional, or
national agencies, but also private and nongovernmental institutions that help
address conflict.
Most broadly, conflict resolution can happen in a court, through a government
agency, in a quasi-public context, through a NGO, or in a private context. Traditional
governance processes-such as rulemaking or adjudication-are ways of resolving
conflict in the creation and enforcement of public law. Rulemaking is the quasi-
legislative collection of information to create a new rule, regulation, or guideline
of general and prospective applicability. Adjudication is the retrospective
examination of facts involving specific parties to determine rights in accordance
with a legal standard, such as a statute or regulation. Both of these processes
reconcile the conflicting interests of citizens and stakeholders with the public
policy goals of elected officials as expressed in law.
Conflict resolution can also happen through a variety of new governance
processes. These processes are alternative quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative
processes with a variety of names, including alternative or appropriate dispute
resolution (ADR), consensus-building, dialogue, and deliberative democracy.' 3
10. The Republic of Korea [hereinafter South Korea or Korea].
11. See Paul B. Stephan, Relationship of the United States to International Institutions: The New
International Law-Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1555 (1999).
12. Robert Hockett, From Macro to Micro to "Mission-Creep": Defending the IMF's Emerging
Concern with the Infrastructural Prerequisites to Global Financial Stability, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 153,
156 (2002) (observing that the International Monetary Fund is concerned with property law, contract rights,
judicial reform, and other market-facilitating legal and institutional arrangements partly as a result of the Asian
Monetary Crisis of 1997 to 2000).
13. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Tina Nabatchi & Rosemary O'Leary, The New Governance: Practices and
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Increasingly, these alternative processes are becoming an essential feature of
governance. The terms consensus-building, dialogue, and deliberative democracy
tend to refer to quasi-legislative processes. They help government to engage
citizens and stakeholders to identify policy preferences and set priorities that in
turn are used to formulate rules, guidelines, and regulations. In the United States,
new quasi-legislative governance processes include forms of deliberative
democracy 4 such as the 21st Century Town Meeting of AmericaSpeaks, 5 e-
democracy, Public Conversations,' 6 participatory budgeting, citizen juries, Study
Circles, 7 and collaborative policymaking, among others.'8 The term ADR most
often refers to quasi-judicial processes that engage citizens and stakeholders in
implementing and enforcing public law and policy. ADR includes various forms
and models of negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. All new governance
processes permit citizens and stakeholders to actively participate in the work of
government.
Moreover, these processes are used increasingly at all levels and sectors of
governance. They are a feature of the emerging international governance
structures, as sovereign nations negotiate treaties that provide for conciliation and
dispute settlement, followed by arbitration before new international courts. These
processes have not been adequately studied in any of the contexts or sectors in
which they are in use, and South Korea is no exception. South Korea is building
these new governance processes into a variety of its government institutions, and
creating both an opportunity and a need for participation by its citizens and civil
society in the policy process. This, in turn, is changing both the nature of
information available to government in making public policy choices and the
likely range of outcomes in conflict resolution.
III. CONTROL OVER DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN
For purposes of this article, private conflict resolution is a new governance
process conducted by someone other than a judge in the judicial branch of
government, an administrative law judge, or a public servant in the executive
branch of government. The outcomes of private conflict resolution vary with the
context of the system in which the process occurs. Dispute system design is the
Processes for Stakeholder and Citizen Participation in the Work of Government, 65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 547
(2005).
14. For descriptions of all these processes, see National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation,
www.thataway.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2006); see also Collaborative Governance Initiative of the Institute for
Local Government, www.ilsg.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
15. See America Speaks, www.americaspeaks.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
16. See Public Conversations Project, http://www.publicconversations.org/pcp/index.asp (last visited
Nov. 12, 2006).
17. See Study Circles Resource Center, http://www.studycircles.org/en/index.aspx (last visited Feb. 7,
2006).
18. See generally JOHN GASTIL, THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOcRACY HANDBOOK (John Gastil ed., Jossey-
Bass 2005).
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concept that dispute resolution occurs through a system of steps and rules for the
process, where this system is the product of a conscious series of choices and
subject to a wide variation of resulting designs.' 9 Originally conceived as
describing innovations in a collectively bargained grievance procedure (such as
grievance mediation), the concept has broader applicability as a useful way to
think about the design of new governance processes.
There are three basic categories of parties with control over dispute system
design: (1) private parties who jointly design the system for themselves; (2) one
party who designs it unilaterally and uses superior economic power to impose it
on the other party; and (3) third parties who design a system for the benefit of
others who are the disputants.2 °
An example of the first category of joint private ordering is when two parties
design a system together, as is the case in private commercial international
arbitrations. Similarly, in labor relations and collective bargaining authorized by
law, there are repeat players-both unions and management. Together, they create
an organic, self-regulating balanced system for labor mediation and grievance
arbitration. These systems are generally seen as fair, useful, functional, and
economically efficient.
A second category of private ordering is where one party designs the system
unilaterally. This is commonly used and is a growing practice in the United States.
The unilateral design of a system is achieved through adhesive mandatory
arbitration, in which one party designs an arbitration plan and imposes it through
superior economic power on the other party. Under the Federal Arbitration Act and
federal preemption, these are enforceable arbitration agreements with a limited
scope of review. However, there are some unresolved problems with this form of
private ordering, such as power asymmetries. Power asymmetries include to repeat
players using their structural advantage in the process to achieve superior outcomes
over one-shot players; for example, the individual employee who may only use
arbitration once is a one-shot player.2' Altematively, some one-party designs use
12voluntary mediation, and these designs pose less concern.
Finally, there is public institution-building, in which third parties design
arbitration or mediation programs for use by disputants. These third parties are not
parties to the actual arbitration or mediation, but they create additional means for
dispute resolution. These processes are generally seen as fair and balanced. Often,
third parties ensure that there is stakeholder and disputant participation or
democratic forms of voice in the design process.
19. WILLIAM URY, JEANNE BRETr, & STEVEN GOLDBERG, GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED (Jossey-Bass
1989).
20. See Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Control Over Dispute Design and Mandatory Commercial Arbitration,
67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221 (2004).
21. Symposium, Self-determination in Dispute System Design and Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 873, 874 n.5 (2002).
22. LISA BLOMGREN BINGHAM, MEDIATION AT WORK: TRANSFORMING WORKPLACE CONFLICT AT THE
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE (IBM Center for the Business of Government 2003).
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As discussed below, Korea is in the midst of a dramatic growth in third-party
dispute system design through initiatives by government. However, it has limited
formal private ordering through joint or one-party dispute system designs.
IV. RECENT MOVEMENTS TOWARD NEW GOVERNANCE
PROCESSES IN KOREA
This section will describe the backdrop for dispute resolution in Korea. It
will also review innovations in progress in the judicial branch of government and
then address innovations in the executive branch. This section will briefly
examine the administrative law context for these innovations, discuss
developments at the National Labor Relations Commission, examine proposals
for a national model for public policy conflict resolution, and describe Korea's
first major environmental mediation case.
A. The Backdrop for Dispute Resolution in Korea
Toward the end of the twentieth century, Korea moved from a dictatorship to
a vibrant and developing democracy, one that has flourished in the past decade.
There was dramatic economic growth during this period, something that became
known as the "Asian Tiger" phenomenon. However, vertically-integrated
corporate conglomerates, called chaebol, dominated the economy. 23 These
organizations were very closely held in point of fact, if not de jure. They were
founded by families, and control of a chaebol either remained in the hands of the
founder or passed to the second- and third-generation of the family.
24
An economic crisis in 1997-199825 was partly a function of dramatic leverage
that the chaebol were able to obtain with a centralized and government-supported
banking system.26 For example, these companies obtained a borrowing-to-assets
ratio of 500% in 1997 .27 The top thirty chaebol have overlapping boards of
directors and stock ownership; total family ownership interests are 43% as a
23. Milhaupt, supra note 9, at 205-09.
24. Id. at 206.
25. Financial and Corporate Restructuring Assistance Project, Final Report and Legal Reform Re-
commendations to the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Korea, 26 IOWA J. CORP. L. 546 (2001).
26. Craig P. Ehrlich & Doe Seob Kang, Independence and Corruption in Korea, 16 COLUM. J. ASIAN L.
1, 3 (2002) (arguing that a 2001 anticorruption law making it a crime for a public official to accept a gift in
excess of 50,000 won had insufficient enforcement tools, and that the economic crisis of 1997 was partly a
function of corruption as part of the relationship among the chaebol, the government, and the banks during
decades of development from the 1960s to the 1990s).
27. Milhaupt, supra note 9, at 207 n.39. See also Hockett, supra note 9, at 175 (observing that the Asian
Financial Crisis began when investors noted weaknesses in the financial system of South Korea and other Asian
Nations consisting of weak regulatory oversight, huge, unhedged private short-term debt in foreign currencies,
inadequately transparent corporate balance sheet data, corruption, and interlocking governments, banks, and
firms); see also Ehrlich & Kang, supra note 26, at 28-29 (observing that banks continue to extend credit to
manufacturers not capable of servicing their debt, and do so at the direction of the government).
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function of cross-shareholding in the top thirty chaebol.2 s In addition, these
chaebol control 41% of the domestic economy, according to a 1995 study.2 9
There is a cultural tradition of deference to authority from the Confucian era.
This deference has an impact on how Korea will use dispute resolution. For
example, it can inhibit party empowerment in mediation. Specifically, the
Confucian tradition established a governmental meritocracy in which bureaucrats
made decisions intending to build a better society and community. This is more
consistent with quasi-judicial or arbitral decisionmaking. It is an autocratic, not a
democratic, legacy for Korea.
Moreover, the vertical concentration of power in the chaebol tends to
suppress disputes. However, as a result of the financial crisis in the late 1990s,
substantive laws gave more rights to shareholders, created more transparency,
and ensured more accountability for the boards of directors of the chaebol. 30 They
also directly addressed cultural traditions of gift-giving that may appear as
corruption and bribery under international norms. 3' These reforms tend to
introduce more disputes as shareholders and members of the public obtain more
information about chaebol board decisionmaking. The prospect of future
reunification with North Korea gives added meaning to all law reform in South
Korea. Some commentators nevertheless advocate continued reform of corporate
32governance.
There are also cultural forces that support the use of dispute resolution.
Korea has a rich tradition of informal conciliation in communities and at the
workplace that stems from its Confucian heritage.33 In this tradition, elders,
superiors, and family clan members may informally intervene, without authority,
to effect reconciliation because conflict disrupts the harmony of the community.
This informal conciliation stresses both evaluative 34 and directive mediation
styles, as those terms are used in more recent U.S. literature. 3' These de facto,
informal mediators will not hesitate to tell both parties that the other is at fault,
then chide, criticize, suggest solutions, educate, threaten, urge reconciliation,
28. Milhaupt, supra note 9, at 205.
29. Id. at 205 n.27. The top 30 chaebols controlled 47.3% in 1995, 47.1% in 1996, 46.6% in 1997,
47.1% in 1998, and 40.6% in 1999. See In-Hahk Hwang et al., Chaebol Structure and Policy, in INDUSTRY
POLICY (KERI 2000). The top five chaebols controlled 26.3% in 1999.
30. Financial and Corporate Restructuring Assistance Project, supra note 25, at 546; Ehrlich & Kang,
supra note 26, at 1.
31. Ehrlich & Kang, supra note 26, at 22-24.
32. Milhaupt, supra note 9, at 216-17; Ehrlich & Kang, supra note 26, at 6 (discussing failure of the
2001 reforms to create the position of independent counsel with tenure or other independent investigative body
to address charges of corruption and whistleblowing).
33. Nam Hyeon Kim, James A. Wall, Jr., Dong-Won Sohn & Jay S. Kim, Community and Industrial
Mediation in South Korea, 37 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 361 (1993); Dong-Won Sohn & James A. Wall, Jr.,
Community Mediation in South Korea: A City-Village Comparison, 37 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 536 (1993).
34. Kim et al., supra note 33, at 367-68, 371-73 (about the same for both community and workplace
disputes); Sohn & Wall, supra note 33, at 541-42 (about the same for both city and village disputes).
35. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION (2d ed. 2003).
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compromise in the interest of community harmony, and cap it off with
considerable use of alcohol to enable face-saving communication.36 This cultural
tradition is outside any formal dispute-system design. Any formal structures or
social institutions for mediation practice that were in place as a result of the
Confucian tradition appear to have been suppressed during the Japanese
occupation of Korea in the first half of the twentieth century.37
Korea does not have dispute resolution in the form of joint private ordering
to the same extent as the United States. There is limited use of commercial
arbitration.3 8 There is the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board ("KCAB"),
39
which handles both domestic cases, defined as those involving parties with their
principal offices or permanent headquarters in the Republic of Korea, and
international cases, which are all others.40 Unlike arbitration rules of various U.S.
third-party providers, such as the American Arbitration Association, ' the
arbitration rules of the KCAB are reviewed and approved by the Korean Supreme
Court.42 The KCAB reported receiving and opening a total of 210 cases in
2002-163 cases were domestic and 47 cases were international. From the 210
cases, 167 went to an award, 35 were withdrawn, and 8 were stopped.43 The
caseload appears stable. In 2003, the KCAB reported opening a total of 211
cases-173 domestic and 38 international, where a total of 202 cases went to an
award, 40 were withdrawn, and 7 were stopped." Generally, about four-fifths of
the cases are domestic, and one-fifth are international .45 Among the international
cases, the most common claims are non-payment, delayed shipment, contract
cancellation, and unacceptable quality of goods. 6 Korea adopted a version of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration ("UNCITRAL Model Law") in 1999, and
named it the Korean Arbitration Act.47 Thus, in terms of legal infrastructure for
international commercial arbitration, Korea is in the mainstream as a modern
industrial economy.
36. Kim et al., supra note 33, at 369.
37. Id. at 366.
38. Kwang-Rok Kim, How Do You Settle Business Disputes with Koreans?: The Advent of a New
Amendment to the Korean Arbitration Act, 15 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 227 (2002).
39. See The Korean Commercial Arbitration Board, www.kcab.or.kr/English (last visited Nov. 15,
2005).
40. Arbitration Rules of Korean Commercial Arbitration Board (KCAB), ch. 1, art. 2 (2004), www.kcab.
or.kr/English/M6/M6_S2.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
41. See American Arbitration Association, www.adr.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2006) (listing the various
rles and protocols administered by the American Arbitration Association).
42. Id.
43. These are the most recent statistics on the KCAB website, reported at Korean Commercial
Arbitration Board, www.kcab.or.kr/English/ M5/M5_S4.asp (last visited Jan. 2, 2006).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Kwang-Rok Kim, supra note 38, at 229-30; Arbitration Act of Korea (Amended by Act No, 6083 as
of Dec. 31, 1999), www.kcab.or.kr/English/M6/M6-Sl.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
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Korea makes very limited use of one-party dispute-system designs, such as
mandatory commercial and employment arbitration, as those processes are used
in the United States. While Korean credit card companies may be adopting the
same language for arbitration as their U.S. peers, there is no equivalent of the
Federal Arbitration Act to limit the scope of judicial supervision over abuses. In
contrast, the Korean Arbitration Act allows courts broad discretion to set aside
awards that are contrary to Korean law or public policy.49
Korea does not have a tradition of independent mediation practice. ° The
KCAB offers mediation services as well as commercial arbitration services5 ' It
mediates using members of its staff as neutrals, provides its services free of
charge, and generally conducts mediation by telephone or correspondence,
48. One-party dispute system design is permitted under the Arbitration Act of Korea § 8 (3). One use
concerns disputes among credit card companies, stores, and customers regarding a customer's use of a credit
card. Personal communications with staff members of LG Card Co., Ltd. (January 31, 2006).
49. The Arbitration Act of Korea provides as follows:
Article 36 (Application for Setting Aside Award to Court)
(1) Recourse against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside
to a court.
(2) An arbitration award may be set aside by the court only if:
I. The party making the application furnishes proof that:
(a) a party to the arbitration agreement was under some incapacity under the law
applicable to him; or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the
parties have subjected it, or failing any indication thereon, under the law of the
Republic of Korea; or
(b) a party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of
the arbitrator or arbitrators or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to
present his case; or
(c) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms
of the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope
of the submission to arbitration. If the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration
can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the award which
contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or
(d) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure were not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict
with any provision of this Act from which the parties cannot derogate or, failing
such agreement, were not in accordance with this Act; or
2. The court finds on its own initiative that:
(a) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the
law of the Republic of Korea; or
(b) the recognition and enforcement of the award is in conflict with the good morals or
other public policy of the Republic of Korea.
(3) An application for setting aside the award shall be made within three months of the date
on which the party making that application has received the duly authenticated award or,
if a request has been made under Article 34, the duly authenticated copy of a correction
or interpretation or an additional award.
50. Kwang-Taeck Woo, A Comparison of Court-Connected Mediation in Florida and Korea, 22
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 605, 608 (stating that "[v]oluntary mediation by parties' agreement without court
intervention was available, but very rare. Accordingly, mediation in Korea is generally a court-connected
procedure in which the court intervenes and leads.").
51. See Korean Commercial Arbitration Board, www.kcab.or.kr/English/M3/M3-Sl.asp (last visited
Jan. 2, 2006).
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although in-person mediation is available. 2 Unlike the United States, mediation
settlements reached with the assistance of the KCAB are not legally binding, but
the KCAB reports that most settlements are implemented voluntarily.13 It reports
that in 2002, it opened 470 domestic and international mediation cases, which
were divided roughly in half between the two categories 4 In 2003, it opened 451
cases.15 The KCAB reports that the majority of international mediation cases
involve non-payment, delayed shipment, and unacceptable quality of goods, in
that order of frequency. 6
Thus, Korea has both the legal infrastructure and the institutional capacity for
private dispute resolution in the form of commercial arbitration and mediation.
Nevertheless, in light of Korea's status as the eleventh largest economy in the
world,57 with a population of 48 million people 8 and a relatively low reported
caseload in mediation and arbitration for commercial disputants, it would appear
that private dispute resolution is not yet fully institutionalized in Korea.
In contrast, the United States has experienced dramatic growth in party-
initiated private ordering and dispute system design. One case is particularly
illustrative: the development of the Center for Public Resources ("CPR")
Institute. For a period of time, there was a growing phenomenon of Fortune 500
companies suing each other. 9 In-house counsel at these companies decided they
needed to reduce their litigation budgets for outside counsel. As a result, these
companies joined forces to create CPR, which became the CPR Institute, and
they created the CPR Pledge in which they agreed to adopt a policy of using
ADR before resorting to the courts.6 Private companies have certain formal
dispute resolution systems, such as labor-management committees, collective
bargaining, and related grievance procedures that provide due process. However,
in Korea, there are cultural understandings and integration of businesses that
suppress disputes among the chaebol. Moreover, there appears to be no formal
dispute-system design governing disputes within the chaebol group.
At present, there is limited curriculum on negotiation, mediation, arbitration,
and dispute resolution in law departments, public administration programs, and
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Mediation Statistics of the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board, www.kcab.or.kr/English/M5/M5
_S4.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
55. Id. The KCAB does not report settlement rates for its mediated cases.
56. Id.
57. Financial and Corporate Restructuring Assistance Project, supra note 25, at 550.
58. Hoyoon Nam, U.S. -Style Law School System in Korea: Mistake or Accomplishment?, 28 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 879, 880 (2005).
59. Marc Galanter, Contracts Symposium: Contract in Court; or Almost Everything You May or May
Not Want to Know About Contract Litigation, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 577 (2001).
61. See International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution, www.cpradr.org/CMS-disp.asp?
page=AbtBegan&M=l.3 (last visited Jan. 2, 2006).
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business schools." As a result, there is no substantial institutional infrastructure
for negotiation or dispute-resolution training. There are no established
professional associations or obvious sources of trained mediators, although there
is a roster of arbitrators maintained by the KCAB. These are challenges for
implementing private dispute resolution.
There is limited one-party dispute system design activity in South Korea. It
stands to reason because this is a culture with more collectivist than individualist
traditions. Until recently, there was a tradition of lifetime commitment to the
employment relationship. In personal communications with government officials
and law professors, there was a universally negative response to the prospect of
mandatory, adhesive arbitration clauses. Interviewees expressed considerable
concern about corruption in decisionmakers. Interviewees reported that they have
no equivalent to the Federal Arbitration Act, which limits judicial review over
arbitration awards,63 nor did they believe it likely that there would be any
innovation in legal infrastructure that would permit this kind of adhesive use of
arbitration in Korea.64 In contrast, a recent study in the United States found that
one-third of the market basket of goods and services in greater Los Angeles,
California, incorporate adhesive arbitration clauses designed unilaterally by the
corporate, institutional party.65
In contrast to the limited private ordering in Korea, there is exciting
innovation by government in institutional legal infrastructure for dispute
resolution. This constitutes third-party dispute-system design because the
government is designing systems for the use of the public and disputants. This is
part of a larger paradigm shift that the government has framed as democracy-
building and public participation.' 6 Executive branch agencies and institutions are
already engaging in activities to implement these new governance processes,
anticipating an executive order.67 The process under discussion essentially builds
dispute resolution into governance by allowing the engagement of citizens and
stakeholders in governmental decisionmaking processes. However, there are
limited institutions and infrastructure to support dispute resolution. For example,
62. Personal communications with faculty members at Yonsei University Department of Public Admin-
istration (September 26, 2005); at Yonsei University Department of Law (September 27, 2005); and at
Sungkyunkwan University Business School (September 28, 2005). These universities are in the top five
nationwide.
63. For a review of interpretations of the Federal Arbitration Act, see David S. Schwartz, Mandatory
Arbitration: Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal
Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (2004).
64. For a review of the state of mandatory arbitration in the United States, see Thomas B. Metzloff,
Foreward: Mandatory Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2004).
65. Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through Predispute
Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (2004).
66. The current president was a public interest advocate who sympathizes with the labor union
movement. He is a one-term president trying to change the culture for citizen involvement and public
participation as his political legacy. This creates a unique window for change.
67. Executive Order for Managing Conflicts in Public Administration (pending legislation).
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there is no professional body of mediators in dispute resolution practice. A new
center for dispute-resolution training in the executive branch is systematically
benchmarking the best practices of other countries. South Korea is a knowledge
economy. It has bootstrapped its way up the world economic ladder through
education and the development of human capital. The government will
benchmark ways to build conflict resolution capacity.
B. The Judicial Branch: The Korean Supreme Court and ADR
Disputes in the civil justice system in Korea differ greatly from that in the
United States. The legal profession is small and elite. Legal education does not
take place in graduate schools, as in the American model; instead, there are
undergraduate law departments with a first degree in law, similar to the European
model and what was formerly prevalent in Japan.68 Professors in these law
schools have graduate degrees in law, but most have not practiced law or been
admitted to the bar.69 Those with undergraduate law degrees or those who read
the law, but have no formal training, are eligible to take the sabubshihum, the
Korean equivalent of the bar exam. 70 Fewer than 1000 people, about 1% of the
test-takers, pass it each year, and as a result, there is one lawyer in Korea for
every 4800 people.7' In contrast, in the United States, there is one lawyer for
every 300 people.72
Upon passing the sabubshihum, prospective lawyers receive two years of
additional training at the Judicial Research and Training Institute ("JRTI"),
mostly from professors who are judges or prosecutors.73 Although lawyers in
private practice enjoy great prestige and high incomes, there are some lawyers
who claim not to have sufficiently lucrative work. On the other hand, there is
concern that the small number of lawyers limits access to justice. 75 The
government will be experimenting with a set of reforms to provide graduate
education in law combined with easing the standards for admission to the bar in
order to improve access to justice, permit lawyers to specialize, and ensure that
76lawyers have a broader general education.
68. Nam, supra note 58, at 33.
69. Id. at 913.
70. Id. at 885-86 (describing three phases: (1) a multiple choice exam on civil, constitutional, and
criminal law, and on English, as well as one elective from criminal policy, international law, international
transactions, intellectual property, economy law, labor law, legal philosophy, and tax; (2) an essay examination
on administrative law, civil law, civil procedure, commercial, constitutional, and criminal law, and criminal
procedure; and (3) an interview covering ethics, specialized knowledge, communication skills, manner and
attitude, and creativity and perseverance).
71. Id. at 879-80.
72. Id. at 880.
73. Id. at 888.
74. Id. at 902.
75. Id. at 916.
76. Id. at 895-96 (describing the Korean Supreme Court Judicial Reform Committee's Law School Plan,
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Korea is beginning to move from a civil code tradition toward a common law
system. The Korean Supreme Court will be supervising an experiment with the
jury system.77 The judicial branch has created and will soon implement a virtual
courtroom, in which the courts can conduct full-scale civil trials over the Internet
and through the use of video-teleconferencing. This is viewed as a move to make
disputing more efficient.
The Korean Supreme Court's Task Force on Civil Justice Reform (the "Task
Force") is also undertaking a redesign of the entire national civil justice system to
add new forms of ADR-specifically, mediation and arbitration. There will be
one new national court-connected dispute system design. In the United States, we
have allowed the thousand flowers to bloom; every state and federal court has its
own dispute system design and there is wide variation.7
At present, Korean judges supervise mediation. Judges may mediate upon the
motion of a party or by court referral. Judges may mediate their own cases using a
format similar to a judicial settlement conference, or they may appoint a three-
person mediation committee (composed of two neutral non-judge commissioners
with special subject matter expertise and a judge who chairs); however, they will
supervise the case carefully either way.8° The process resembles med-arb, s' in
which a mediation process can turn into an adjudicatory one if the parties fail to
reach a mutual settlement. The mediator-judge may issue an arbitration award that
under review by a government committee of officials, legal scholars, practitioners, civic activists under the
supervision of the Minister of Education and Human Resources Development).
77. Personal communication with June Young Chung, Judge, Deputy Director General for Litigation
Affairs and other members of the Korean Supreme Court Task Force on Civil Justice Reform, in Seoul, South
Korea (Sept. 26, 2005); email from Jin-suk Chun, MPA and member of the Ministry of Education, Seoul, South
Korea (on file with authors) (describing draft bill entitled "The Law of Public Participation in Criminal Justice,"
drafted by the Commission of Legal System Reform and submitted May 16, 2005, which would implement a
five to nine member criminal jury, the number varying with the seriousness of the charge). See also Civil
Mediation Act § 7.
78. For recent reviews of the literature evaluating various court-connected ADR designs in the United
States, see Roselle Wissler, The Effectiveness of Court-Connected Dispute Resolution in Civil Cases, 22
CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 55 (2004); and John Lande, Commentary: Focusing on Program Design Issues in Future
Research on Court-Connected Mediation, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 89 (2004). Both articles are part of a double
issue symposium that collects field and applied research on dispute resolution in seven substantive areas: courts,
employment, education, community, victim offender reconciliation, family, and the environment. See
Symposium, Conflict Resolution in the Field: Assessing the Past, Charting the Future, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q.
1-320 (2004).
79. Kwang-Taeck Woo, A Comparison of Court-Connected Mediation in Florida and Korea, 22
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 605 (1997) (describing processes in effect under the Civil Mediation Act, Law No. 4202
(Jan. 13, 1990), amended by Law No. 4505 (Nov. 30, 1992), and Law No. 5007 (Dec. 6, 1995)). This law
applies to civil mediation, but not family or labor mediation. Id. at 609.
80. Id. at 613-15.
8 I. Id. at 630. Mediation-arbitration, or med-arb, is a process in which the same neutral third-party first
serves as a mediator, but if the parties reach an impasse, the mediator converts to an arbitrator to ensure a final
and binding resolution of the dispute. The same neutral conducts two different ADR processes in sequence. For
a discussion of the different ways mediation and arbitration can be combined, and of med-arb's strengths and
weaknesses, see COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS USERS 20-
30 (Thomas J. Stipanowich & Peter H. Kaskell eds., 2001).
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is essentially advisory, where the parties may reject it within a limited time. 2
Moreover, the mediator-judge retains the authority to approve the reasonableness
of any voluntary settlement or reject it, substituting his or her own judgment for the
parties' solution.83 There are concerns about confidentiality in this model, as is true
with med-arb in the United States; specifically, the parties may be less forthcoming
with a mediator who can use any information they share against them in the
subsequent arbitration. 4 Moreover, in Korea, mediation processes are open to the
public.85
Korea has seen a tremendous growth in caseload and a new willingness of
individuals to file claims. Disputes are increasing in many different forums,86
87including against administrative agencies and in cases involving constitutional
issues.88 During the period of Japan's occupation of Korea, it had tremendous
control over and influence on Korean law, to the extent that eventually proceedings
had to be conducted in Japanese before Japanese judges. This made Koreans
understandably reluctant to resort to the courts for redress of wrongs. 9 However,
since 1987 and the democratization of Korea, disputing patterns have changed;
people are more willing to file claims.9° During the 1990s, the annual number of
civil litigations filed in district courts (the first level of the Korean justice system)
increased tremendously. For example, approximately 1.5 million cases were filed
in 1991, whereas over 4 million cases were filed in 1998. 91 This dramatic increase
in caseload has led to the Korean Supreme Court's consideration of a national
92private ADR system.
The Task Force is conducting research to establish its dispute system design.
It is examining the training and qualifications of neutrals, whether mediators
should be court employees or outsiders, who will pay the neutrals and how much,
and how mediation agreements and arbitration awards are enforced. The court is
reconsidering fundamental legal infrastructure. The question is: what forms of
82. Woo, supra note 79, at 630.
83. Id. at 629-30.
84. See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS USERS,
supra note 80, at 21-22.
85. Woo, supra note 79, at 616.
86. Id. at 609.
87. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 618-19 (observing that although both Japanese and Korean societies have
traditionally been seen as valuing consensus and avoiding courts, in 1995, Korean courts decided 214.9
administrative cases per million persons while Japanese courts decided only 7.6 cases per million persons, and
suggesting that this is related to administrative law reform).
88. Woo, supra note 78, at 620-21.
89. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 596-97.
90. One study reports dramatic use of a new system for civil complaints and administrative litigation. Id.
at 610.
91. See Sahng Hyeog Ihm, Lawsuit Avoiding Tradition in East Asia and Reconsideration of it in Korean
Society 6-7 (May 30, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
92. Personal communication with Sangjoon Kim, Judge, Deputy Director General for Planning and
Coordination, Supreme Court of Korea, in Seoul, South Korea (July 26, 2004).
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dispute resolution and what dispute system design will they build into the courts?
This raises questions of the timing of dispute resolution, where to mediate, what
rules to establish regarding confidentiality, the role other agencies, such as the
National Labor Relations Commission, have in the enforcement of the outcomes
of ADR, and whether there are other functions or services the court needs to
fund. For example, the court will consider matters such as funding research and
evaluation. In the United States, in contrast, such funding has mostly come from
philanthropy.
Korea's innovation is a response to cultural changes, specifically, increasing
prosperity and deepening democracy. The Task Force is engaged in the
comprehensive work of dispute system design, and the result will provide private
dispute resolution for all those engaged in civil litigation in South Korea.
C. The Executive Branch: Administrative Law and the Bureaucracy in Korea
As the result of almost half a century of occupation by Japan, Korea inherited
a body of administrative law and practice that was built on a German model for a
modem state.93 Under this civil code model, bureaucrats operated with substantial
administrative discretion, and used informal administrative guidance to induce
voluntary compliance by the regulated community under implicit threat of
retaliation.94 They were insulated from meaningful judicial review by a judicial
branch staffed with junior judges who lacked subject matter expertise and were
trained in a system that acculturated them not to exercise independent
supervision over the policy process.9 However, comparative law scholars have
noted that Korea diverged in both law and practice from this common base, and
now reflects administrative law infrastructure that fosters transparency, public
96participation, freedom of information, and meaningful judicial review.
As part of this process of both democratization and administrative law reform
in the early 1990s, Korea implemented new mechanisms for voice, participation,
and dispute settlement in the executive branch.9 Specifically, it adopted notice
and comment processes not only for rulemaking, but also for legislative
proposals, the great majority of which are drafted 98 by government ministries.99 It
created an Ombudsman to receive complaints about the administrative
93. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 589-90.
94. Id. at 593-94.
95. Id. at 595-96.
96. Id. at615-22.
97. Id. at 607 (describing the creation of a designated administrative court of the first instance, a
provision eliminating the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies, and an Administrative Appeals
Commission under the Prime Minister).
98. Id. at 608.
99. Id. at 607-08 (characterizing these processes as more open than notice and comment rulemaking in
the United States because they apply to legislation as well as rulemaking).
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bureaucracy from members of the public.'04 It also created a National Grievance
Settlement Committee under the Prime Minister to settle civil petitions.' °' The
government's newest wave of innovation focuses on forms of dispute resolution,
deliberation, and dialogue for both quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative
government functions.
D. The Korean National Labor Relations Commission
An example of mediation for quasi-judicial functions is the Korean National
Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC"),' 2 which is an independent commission
responsible for the administration of national private sector labor law.' 3 There is
approximately an 11% rate of private sector unionism in South Korea.
'
0
4
Interviewees report that labor relations are increasingly adversarial. In the private
sector, there are comprehensive bargaining units capable of shutting down an
entire industry.' 5
The NLRC is a quasi-judicial governmental body, composed of tripartite
representatives of workers, employers, and those supporting public interests. It is
affiliated with the Department of Labor. The NLRC conducts adjudications
regarding unfair labor practices and unfair dismissal, and through its regional
structure, executes special labor relations services like mediation and arbitration.
The NLRC is considering improvements in governance to broaden its use of
mediation and interest-based negotiation.' 4 Recent legislative reforms will permit
national government workers to join unions for the first time,° and also create a
right for temporary or contract workers to file complaints of discrimination.' 8
These are changes in substantive law. These laws are part of an effort to give the
private sector more flexibility in designing its workforce and hiring and firing
100. Id. at 608.
101. Id.
102. See National Labor Relations Commission, http://www.nlrc.go.kr/en/enindex.html (last visited
Feb. 7, 2006).
103. Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, Act No. 5310, arts. 53-61 (1997) (S. Korea),
amended by Act No. 5511 (1998) & Act No. 6456 (2001), available at http://wwwdynamic-korea.com/archives/
view.archives.php?uid=200500003145&main=doc.
104. In 2003, private sector unionization was 10.8%, and 22.5% out of full time employees have union
membership, while temporary and contract workers had 1.5% and 0.4% respectively as of August 2004. See
Korea Labor Institute, http://www.kli.re.kr/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
105. There are two influential bargaining units in Korea: the Federation of Korean Trade Unions
(http://www.efktu.or.kr/-fktueng/); and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (http://www.kctu.org/).
106. Personal communications with representatives from the National Labor Relations Commission, in
Seoul, South Korea (Sept. 28, 2005).
107. Public Officials Trade Union Act became effective on Jan. 28, 2006. Korean government
employees have legally organized government workers' unions. This act legalized unions for government
workers.
108. The Equal Employment Act guarantees employees the right to file complaints of sexual
discrimination. However, it has been controversial in Korea whether temporary or contract workers are included
under this Act.
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workers. The Korea Tripartite Commission is responsible for issues of
government employee unionization and temporary or contract workers.
Nevertheless, the NLRC is anticipating a dramatic growth in caseload, in part
related to these initiatives.
The question is: how does one manage the growing caseload? The NLRC is
examining system designs from other countries and considering the use of
interest-based negotiation and mediation to address the anticipated increase in
disputes. The chair of the NLRC holds rank of cabinet minister. The NLRC
institutional structure includes a national office and regional offices in which
there are professionals who serve as labor mediators and administrative law
judges. The NLRC also mediates, arbitrates, and adjudicates. '°9 Interviewees
report that the mediation style is very directive." As is common with labor
mediators in the United States, NLRC mediators report that there is the usual
head-knocking, arm-twisting, and reality-testing, in which the mediators give
unions and management opinions on the appropriate outcome of a dispute."'
Evaluative mediation is in some ways like advisory arbitration; the parties
receive an outsider's view of the strength of their best alternative to a negotiated
agreement. This reality-testing serves as a means to get them talking again, a
form of loop-back to negotiation. However, it sometimes simply reinforces an
intransigent party who becomes convinced they can win on the merits.
Interviewees report that NLRC mediators achieve high settlement rates. On
December 31, 2005, the NLRC reported that its average rate of mediation success
was 57.8%.
'
12
There may be a relationship between increasingly adversarial labor relations
and democratization. As Korea opens up new mechanisms for voice through the
discrimination statute on contract and temporary workers and through public
109. The Labor Union and Employee Relations Act §§ 47-80.
110. For a discussion of mediation styles, see ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH FOLGER, THE
PROMISE OF MEDIATION 76-77 (2d ed. 2003). Evaluative mediators tend to listen to parties' presentations on the
merits of the dispute and provide an opinion on the value of the case or its likely outcome in court or before an
administrative agency; they evaluate the case substantively. Directive mediators tend to assert control over the
structure of the mediation process and to actively guide and direct the parties toward a resolution of the dispute,
using various techniques to persuade or pressure the parties to settle. Transformative mediators do not have
settlement of the dispute as their goal, but instead focus on providing the parties with opportunities for
empowerment and recognition during the course of the process. Empowerment is enhancing the disputant's
sense of control and personal efficacy during the process. Recognition is where one disputant understands and
acknowledges the perspective, values, or goals of the other disputant. It can take the form of an apology. A final
form of mediation is facilitative. See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL
STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT (2d ed. 1996). This form of mediation helps the parties identify issues,
their underlying interests and needs, and helps them brainstorm solutions to the dispute, generally using
interest-based negotiation techniques. There is some ongoing discussion within the mediation community as to
the boundaries between these models of practice.
111. Personal communications with representatives from regional NLRC offices at the National
Conference of the NLRC, Ritz Carleton Hotel, in Seoul, South Korea (Sept. 28, 2005).
112. The National Office's rate is 31.5%, and regional offices' rates range from 44.4% to 82.6%,
http://www.nlrc.go.kr/st/stmd-receipt.jsp (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
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sector collective bargaining, increasing numbers of employees may become
willing to file claims. There may be a rich flowering of debate and controversy;
some view conflict as a fundamentally creative force.
The NLRC convened a national conference in September 2005 to benchmark
dispute resolution programs in employment in the United States, and particularly,
the REDRESSTM Program at the U.S. Postal Service ("USPS"). This program is
one in which there is comprehensive data and published empirical results. After
the USPS adopted a mediation program for discrimination complaints, there was
almost a 30% drop in administrative law judge adjudications of formal
complaints of discrimination." '3 Since 1997, the number of formal complaints of
discrimination at the USPS has dropped from a high of 14,000 per year to
between 8000 and 9000 per year. A multivariate regression indicated that the
drop correlated with the introduction of the mediation program over an eighteen-
month period in eighty-five different zip code areas.
There are questions as to whether this program provides a useful model for
the NLRC. The REDRESSTM Program uses the transformative model of
mediation, one that is not evaluative or directive."4 It requires a different type of
training for the mediators; training that is not readily available in South Korea.
Interviewees were exploring training in both interest-based negotiation and
mediation. This again raises the question of what institutional infrastructure is
necessary to support expanded use of private dispute resolution in Korea.
E. The Executive Branch and Public Participation
The public participation theme is manifest in yet another initiative: the
National Conflict Resolution System."5 This initiative of the Korean presidency
will take the form of either an executive order or draft legislation. The proposal is
to build a three-stage dispute resolution procedure into all South Korean national
government agencies that are responsible for development projects or the
management of conflicts over public policy. The three stages are a conflict
impact assessment, deliberative polling in selected appropriate cases, and multi-
stakeholder mediation. The proposal places an emphasis on civic engagement
and public involvement or participation. The conflict impact assessment would
determine the adverse consequences of not resolving the conflict. The Korean
Environmental Institute is likely to be tasked with performing the conflict impact
assessments; it does all the environmental impact statements for major
government actions in Korea. It consists of approximately 120 researchers who
113. Lisa Blomgren Bingham & Mikaela Cristina Novak, Mediation's Impact on Formal Complaint
Filing: Before and After the REDRESSM Program at the United States Postal Service, 21 REV. PUB. PERSONNEL
ADMIN. 308 (2001).
114. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 109.
115. Sun Woo Lee et al., National Conflict Resolution System, Presidential Commission for Sustainable
Development (2004).
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are trained in economics and the natural and environmental sciences. One role
this agency could and should undertake is collecting data on all environmental
and public policy cases in which conflict resolution processes are used. There is
precedent for this as the U.S. Institute of Environmental Conflict Resolution
collects this data nationwide."1
6
The notion of a conflict impact assessment contrasts with a conflict
assessment, which is the practice in multi-stakeholder consensus-building and
dispute resolution processes in the United States. A conflict assessment serves
more of a convening function to determine who the parties are, who should be at
the table, how are they are going to structure the process, and whether it is
reasonable to mediate the dispute or conflict." 7
The second step, deliberative polling, is viewed as a means of conflict
prevention or avoidance. In deliberative polling, the government convenes a
representative sample of the electorate to deliberate on the public policy problem
giving rise to the dispute."' Impartial policy experts are available to answer
questions and provide information. Citizens then deliberate and discuss the
policy issues before they vote on their policy preferences. In the United States,
voting is done by using information technology, including hand-held digital
voting devices keyed with the citizen's demographic information. The voting
results are tabulated and incorporated into a statistical report including
demographics. The report then becomes critical information for policymakers to
use for informed decisionmaking. In the Korean legislation, the third step is
conflict resolution through a mediation process.
Executive branch agencies are moving to implement dispute resolution
processes. Government agencies have started to develop their own conflict
resolution systems. The executive branch has established a training initiative for
government officials.
The executive branch is learning how to build a dispute resolution practice
infrastructure. The government commissioned the Korean Development Institute
School of Public Policy and Management and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology to conduct a comparative conflict resolution studies conference to
help South Korea examine how to build a mediation profession by looking at
how the profession emerged in the United States, Europe, and Japan. The
conference also examined the role of legal infrastructure in the form of enabling
statutes, the emergence of professional organizations, the contributions of the
116. See U.S. Institute for Conflict Resolution, www.ecr.gov (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). For
information on the national evaluation study, see http://www.ecr.gov/ multiagency/program-eval.htm (last
visited Feb. 7, 2006).
117. See MOORE, supra note 110, at 81-160. See also E. FRANKLIN DUKES, MARINA A. PISCOLISH &
JOHN B. STEPHENS, REACHING FOR HIGHER GROUND IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: TOOLS FOR POWERFUL
GROUPS AND COMMUNITIES (Jossey-Bass 2000).
118. See generally The Center for Deliberative Democracy, Deliberative Polling: Toward a Better
Informed Democracy, http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/docs/summary (last visited Feb. 2, 2006) (describing
deliberative polling).
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academic community, and the necessary support for researchers. Much work lies
ahead for Korea to successfully implement and institutionalize these new
governance processes.
F. Environmental and Public Policy Disputes
There has been one significant environmental and public policy mediation
case in South Korea: the Han Tan River Dam Project. The two mediators, Dr.
Chin-Seung Chung and Dr. Sun Woo Lee, were leaders in the public
administration academy. The new governance process was applied to the Hantan
River Dam Conflict as an exemplar.
In 1996, 1998, and 1999, there were serious floods in the lower Imjin River
areas. The Korean government decided a dam construction was necessary to
prevent future flooding." 9 Two-thirds of the Imjin River and its watershed are
under the occupation and control of North Korea. Thus, the government had to
find an alternative that would enable flood prevention because it could not
control the Imjin River. The Hantan River is the biggest of the Imjin River
tributaries, so the government thought the Hantan River might be the second best
option to control the Imjin River flood. However, the proposal to construct the
Hantan River dam created a great deal of conflict involving several parties.
There were five parties: (1) the Ministry of Construction and Transportation
("Ministry"); (2) the Korea Water Resource Corporation ("KWRC") which
together with the Ministry was in charge of dam construction; (3) people living in
the Dam site and downstream ("PD"); (4) people living in the upper stream area
of the Hantan River Dam site ("PU"); and (5) NGOs for environmental
movements. The parties had different interests in the dam. Seemingly, the
Ministry, KWRC, and PD were in favor of dam construction, while the PU and
NGOs were opposed. However, the construction of the dam was very important
to the Ministry and the KWRC for their organizational survival because their
orientation toward developing national land was criticized. In response to this
criticism, the government cancelled its plan to construct a dam a couple of years
before the Hantan River Dam conflict occurred. The PD wanted an early decision,
regardless of dam construction, because they suffered from restrictions on their
property rights during the period of uncertainty. The PU opposed the dam due to
• 20 121
the side effects after dam construction as well as for political reasons. The
119. Sun Woo Lee, Chin-Seung Chung & Soo Sun Park, Study on the Mediation Process of the Hantan
River Dam Conflict, Presidential Commission for Sustainable Development (2005).
120. In fact, they did not have to worry about the side effects because the dam was designed to contain
water for less than fifteen days a year, only when there was a warning of possible flooding. In another sense, the
Hantan River Dam was designed as a so-called flood-controlling dam, in order to avoid the negative effects
brought about by a multi-purpose dam. THE KOREAN ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTE, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT ON HANTAN RIVER DAM (2001).
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NGOs were against any dam, as this would oppose their mission statement and
philosophy.
There were four serious obstacles to mediation. First, there was not enough
data on the amount of flooding in the Imjin River, and no way to measure it,
because the great majority of the river was in North Korea. Second, local
elections of the PU made mediation difficult because political candidates locked
themselves into positions opposing the dam. Third, there were communication
problems and intransigence. For example, a common communication problem
involved a first party raising an issue and a second party providing a solution, but
the first party refused to accept the solution due to stubbornness. In effect, the
first party lacked confidence and trust in the second party, and maintained an
unmoving stance on all issues. Fourth, PU representatives had different interests
in participating in the mediation process. Some wanted to build their political
reputation, while others made efforts to get more benefits for their communities.
The mediation began five years after the conflict began. The mediation team
consisted of two professional mediators-one interpersonal conflict resolution
skills trainer and one representative from the NGOs. The mediation process
started in February 2004. There were thirteen pre-mediation sessions between
February and May 2004, and sixteen mediation sessions between June and
August 2004.22 During the premediation sessions, mediators tried to uncover the
causes and interests of the parties regarding the conflict and to explain the
mediation process to the parties. In doing so, the mediators helped convince the
parties to implement the process, so that members of each party understood and
participated in the mediation process. The mediation process consisted of four
steps: (1) creating a set of ground rules; (2) finding causes; (3) developing
alternatives; and (4) building consensus and agreement. The creation of ground
rules contributed to building mutual trust among conflicting parties.
Mediators worked with the parties until they agreed that the mediation goal
was to determine how to prevent flooding in the lower Injin River area. Out of
seven issues,' 23 the most important and controversial issue was to assess the
amount of floodwater that would be controlled by the Hantan River Dam. Neither
party had superior scientific and technological methods to calculate this amount
and its effects on the Imjin River flood. The failure to assess the amount of
flooding that the Hantan River Dam would control made it difficult to develop
alternatives.
121. There were two local elections at the end of April and October. Political candidates tried to take
advantage of the community opinion against the dam construction, encouraging people's psychological
opposition. It made the mediation very difficult. Lee et al., supra note 119.
122. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, REPORT ON THE HANTAN RIVER
DAM CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCESS (Feb. 2005).
123. There were seven main issues: legitimacy of decisionmaking on the dam construction; the amount
of flooding in lmjin River; the amount of the flood controlled by the Hantan River Dam; environmental effects;
cost-benefit analysis; safety; and tourism. Lee et al., supra note 119.
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In order to advance the mediation process from finding causes to developing
alternatives, the mediation team launched into a two-day overnight session. On
one hand, mediators emphasized that the parties should raise questions and
doubts on the basis of scientific, empirical, and rational arguments. On the other
hand, mediators persuaded the parties that they also had to accept answers to
these questions and explanations responding to these doubts on the basis of
scientific and empirical information. Mediators emphasized that the most
important thing was not measuring the flood amount, but finding alternatives to
prevent the Imjin River from flooding. Through the two-day overnight session,
parties developed five alternatives, one of which was to construct the Hantan
River Dam. The parties then worked together to come to a consensus on the best
one out of the five alternatives. However, the Ministry, KWRC, and the NGOs
each argued for using their own tools to evaluate the alternatives. A three-day
overnight session was scheduled to overcome this obstacle to agreement.
Eventually, the parties realized that it was difficult for them to evaluate the
alternatives by themselves. The stakeholder groups insisted that they could not
reach a mutual, voluntary agreement. They asked the mediators to decide. This is
consistent culturally with Korea's authoritarian tradition. In an authority
structure, disputants are acculturated not to take responsibility for their own
decision to settle. The stakeholders said they all agreed to live with the decision
of the mediators. The parties requested that the mediators select one of the five
alternatives within a one-month timeframe. The parties committed to each other
and to the mediators that they would accept the mediators' decision with no
objection. Members of each party approved the agreement on these rules, which
essentially turned the mediation into an arbitration process. This concluded the
mediation.
The mediators next played the role of arbitrators, issuing a final decision.
Three parties accepted the decision, but one of the stakeholder groups, the PU,
reneged and appealed the decision to an office within the executive branch that
functions similarly to the Inspector General in the United States. That office
referred the case to the Prime Minister's office. The Prime Minister's office
endorsed the decision of the mediators-turned-arbitrators.
This was Korea's first experience with a large-scale environmental
mediation. This illustrates the challenges that lay ahead for institutionalizing
these new governance processes in Korea. Not only is there a need to build the
infrastructure for practitioners, but also users must learn how to participate
effectively in these new processes.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW GOVERNANCE PROCESSES IN KOREA
These developments have broad implications. They are viewed as legal
infrastructure to support continuing economic development. However, the longer
term implications concern possible reunification with North Korea. New
governance processes can play an important role in Korea's continuing evolution.
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A. Dispute Resolution and Economic Development
Why is the South Korean government embarking on this ambitious program
of dispute system design? One motivation has to do with the economy and
economic development. One commentator has made a convincing argument that
the previous wave of administrative law reform in the 1990s was a function of
Korea as a "developmental state"; that is, a state that "directed economic growth
using a variety of activist mechanisms, rather than simply providing an enabling
environment for capitalism as required by liberal ideology."'' 24 Using principal-
agency theory from political economy, it is argued that Korea's administrative
law reforms were designed to provide avenues for out-of-power political players
to influence the policy process because no one party had a lock on re-election or
control over the government. 25 This in turn made it possible for the private
sector, NGOs, and citizens to have more voice in the policy process.
While the jury is still out, there is a growing body of empirical evidence
relating democratic legal infrastructure and the civil justice system to economic
growth.26 There appears to be an underlying motivation for dispute resolution
reforms in Korea. For example, in the court system, although the legislative
mandate for juries is framed as public participation in governance, what seems to
be motivating the dispute system design includes a concern about transaction
costs, the economic efficiency of disputes, economic competitiveness, and
caseload growth. The Task Force is interested in the research of Marc Galanter
on what he has termed the "vanishing trial." His work finds that there is a
decrease over the past two decades both in the absolute number of jury trials and
the trial rate (from 12% to 2%) in U.S. federal district courts.' 27 He suggests that
one of the explanations for these results may be the institutionalization of dispute
resolution.
Similarly, the work of the Korean National Labor Relations Commission
appears to have an underlying economic rationale. Interviewees indicated that
they face changes in substantive legal infrastructure concerning individual
worker job security. Korea is moving toward more flexible hiring and firing.
There were major layoffs in the last fiscal crisis. The political quid pro quo for
increased labor-market flexibility is the new statute prohibiting discrimination
against temporary and contract workers; the new legal infrastructure also
authorizes the opportunity to file more claims, which could increase the
administrative case docket of the NLRC. There is a need to make government
and public law work efficiently to avoid transaction costs. This motivates the
124. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 585.
125. ld. at 618-19.
126. Frank B. Cross, What We Know and Do Not Know About the Impact of Civil Justice on the
American Economy and Policy: Law and Economic Growth, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1737 (2002).
127. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in State
and Federal Courts, I J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 459 (2004).
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need to build new institutions, specifically, forms of private dispute resolution, in
order to keep the economy growing.
For the environment, the salient case examples interviewees gave boiled
down to "We just can't get it done." One example concerned a project to
construct a highway through the mountains. The project was halted when a
Buddhist nun went on a hunger strike. Similarly, the problems with achieving a
settlement in the Han River Dam dispute present significant economic concerns.
There is a need for flood control on the Han River. The water in the river
originates in North Korea. The watershed provides 20% of the nation's drinking
water; its watershed includes Seoul, the capital city that is home to almost a
quarter of the population. There is flooding, and there are concerns about water
quality because of the increase in the construction of hotels and restaurants on the
river's banks upstream. The government needs to build this dam and cannot get it
done without some process for addressing conflict.
In other words, there are significant problems in terms of transportation, land
use, flood control, water quality, and sustainable development. Korea needs the
institutional infrastructure for dispute resolution to facilitate building the hard
infrastructure to solve these problems. Although proposals for either legislation
or executive orders are framed as public participation and democracy-building,
there is also an economic justification for private dispute resolution.
B. Reunification with North Korea
There are implications for the future reunification of Korea. There is a
working group that involves representation from the World Bank, the scholarly
community, South Korea, the United States, and other countries planning for
reunification. 28 Scholars are considering the experience of reunification in
Germany. They are examining privatization experiences in Poland, Russia, and
the Czech Republic. Some observe that North Korea will likely inherit South
Korea's legal infrastructure, and that corporate law reforms underway in South
Korea will aid in the transition of nationalized industry in North Korea to private
hands. This could generate a new wave of disputes. In Germany, there were
many claims for natural restitution of nationalized property that were brought by
heirs of the property owners in both East and West Germany. These claims ended
up in the courts and required special legislation. There may also be disputes
arising out of claims to private ownership of property nationalized in North
Korea.
There are also implications in the area of labor relations. There is little
information available on the North Korean economy and work force. However, it
is foreseeable that reunification accompanied by privatization and the transition
128. Milhaupt, supra note 9.
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to a market economy could prompt a wave of unionism in North Korea. This
could generate work for the NLRC.
There are implications for the environment because of development. A
reunified Korea will need to build a transportation infrastructure between the
former North and South Korea. There may be anticipation of these potential
future sources of conflict in the developments of legal infrastructure, both in
terms of substantive law and institution-building for private dispute resolution in
South Korea.
VI. CONCLUSION
Korea is instituting innovations in national governance that are laying the
groundwork for the next generation of its citizens to participate more
meaningfully in all the aspects of government decisionmaking that affect their
lives. These innovations may also contribute to continuing the growth in the
economy that made the Asian Tigers the envy of the developing world. Private
dispute resolution is an essential part of this legal infrastructure.
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